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In the new era of Digital Age, many daily life applications have been digitized — 
—signature scheme is not an exception. Signature forgery is of great concern for 
all signature schemes, regardless of whether they are paper signature schemes or 
digital signature schemes. Therefore, researchers are always finding new means 
to enhance the security of digital signature schemes. 
Recently, to enhance security, W. He proposed a new digital signature scheme 
whose security is claimed to be based on the difficulty of solving two hard prob-
lems, factoring and discrete logarithm. There are two remarkable merits in the 
W. He signature scheme: First, users in the system can share a common modu-
lus. Second, a user in the system needs to store only one number for her public 
key and only one number for her private key. As a result, the W. He signature 
scheme has an improvement in storage efficiency over the Brickell-McCurley 
signature scheme and the Okamoto signature scheme. 
In this thesis, we present a cryptanalysis of the digital signature scheme of 
W. He, and prove that the digital signature scheme of W. He is not based on 













這篇論文將展示W. He簽章法的密碼分析、提出破解W. He簽章法的方 
法、並證明W. He簽章法的安全機制並不是同時建基於因數分解和離散 
對數問題。 
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Handwritten signature has long been widely used to provide authentication of 
messages, which is of fundamental importance in both the military and com-
mercial arenas. Since it is believed that handwritten signature is unique for 
each person, signing on a document represents one's approval of its content. 
Moreover, that handwritten signature is easy to produce, easy to recognize, and 
difficult to forge makes it a practical and reliable form of authentication. 
However, handwritten signature has some drawbacks, one of which is that a 
signer's handwritten signatures are the same for all documents. In other words, 
handwritten signature is independent of the document being signed. Thus, an 
adversary may be able to learn from studying examples of a signer's signatures 
and then successfully forge signatures for new desired documents. Although 
this attack may be a difficult task, it is not impossible. Another drawback of 
handwritten signature is that it is by its very nature not suitable for electronic 
commerce, in which everything is digital and can be processed quickly and effi-
ciently to facilitate transactions. 
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In the new era of Digital Age, many daily life applications have been digi-
tized signature scheme is not an exception. Digital signature, the digital 
counterpart of handwritten signature, is superior to handwritten signature in 
that it can eliminate the drawbacks of handwritten signature mentioned previ-
ously. The working principle and security of digital signature will be discussed 
in the next sections. 
1.1 Origin of The First Digital Signature Scheme 
The concept of “digital signature” was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman 
in their classic paper “New Directions in Cryptograph^ [1]. After that, the 
first practical realization of the concept was proposed by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman in [2]. This section gives an overview of the RSA signature scheme, 
which illustrates the general working principle of digital signature. 
In the RSA signature scheme, each user (Alice) has a public key and a private 
key. The public key of Alice is known to all users in the system. On the other 
hand, the private key of Alice is kept secret and is known to Alice only. To sign 
a message, Alice uses her private key to produce a signature, which depends on 
both the message and Alice's private key. Then given the message and Alice's 
public key, any user in the system can use the public key of Alice to verify the 
correctness of the signature. The detail mathematical description of the RSA 
signature scheme is discussed in Chapter 3. Not only does the RSA be the 
first practical digital signature scheme, but it also has become the most popular 
digital signature scheme today. 
While the above paragraph gives an overview of the RSA signature scheme, it 
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at the same time illustrates the general working principle of digital signature. As 
only the public key of a signer (say, Alice) is needed for signature verification, 
any user in the system can verify Alice's signatures. Moreover, since no one 
except Alice knows the value of her private key, signature proved to be valid for 
Alice's public key must have been signed by Alice. Furthermore, signatures of 
Alice are different for distinct messages since a signature depends on not only 
Alice's private key but also the message being signed. Therefore, even though 
a digital signature for a message can be duplicated easily, the replica cannot 
be used for other messages. Therefore, if in signature verification procedures a 
signature is proved to be Alice's signature for a message, then one can conclude 
that the signature for the message is indeed generated by Alice. As a result, 
authentication is achieved by the use of digital signature. 
1.2 On the security of digital signature schemes 
As the primary goal of signature is to provide authentication, signature forgery 
is of great concern. 
While the security of handwritten signature lies in the difficulty of producing 
undetectable forged signatures, the security of digital signature depends on the 
intractability of mathematical hard problems. All digital signature schemes 
prevent signature forgery by making use of some well-known hard problems. 
For example, the security of the prevalent RSA digital signature scheme is based 
on the factoring problem. In the RSA signature scheme, if an attacker is able 
to factor a big composite integer, then he can achieve a total break of the 
system and forge signatures. (More specifically, if an attacker can solve the 
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factoring problem, then given the public key of a user the attacker is able to 
compute the corresponding private key of the user.) Known hard problems 
applicable to digital signature schemes include the factoring problem and the 
discrete logarithm problem. 
Prom the previous discussion, we know that if one can solve the hard problem 
on which the security of a digital signature scheme is based, then he can break 
that digital signature scheme and forge signatures whenever he wants to. There-
fore, in order to enhance the security of a digital signature scheme, the security 
of the digital signature scheme can be designed to be based on multiple (instead 
of single) hard problems. For example, Brickell, et al. [3] and Okamoto [4] have 
designed digital signature schemes whose security is based on both the factoring 
and discrete logarithm problems. Recently, W. He [5] proposed a new digital sig-
nature schemes whose security is claimed to be based on both the factoring and 
discrete logarithm problems. In this thesis, we present a cryptanalysis on the 
digital signature scheme of W. He, and prove that the digital signature scheme 
of W. He is not based on both the factoring and discrete logarithm problems. 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, mathematical background 
that is involved in the thesis is introduced, including the Euler totient function, 
Fermat's little theorem, Euler's theorem, quadratic residue, Legendre symbol, 
Jacobi symbol, Blum integer, the factoring problem and the discrete logarithm 
problem. 
Chapter 3 gives a survey on some remarkable digital signature schemes. This 
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includes the RSA signature scheme [2], ElGamal signature scheme [6], Schnorr 
signature scheme [7], Brickell-McCurley signature scheme [3], Okamoto signa-
ture scheme [4], Harn signature scheme [8], Shao signature scheme [9], and W. 
He signature scheme [5]. Throughout the chapter we will examine the merits, 
demerits and security of each digital signature scheme. 
In Chapter 4 we present our cryptanalysis result on the digital signature 
scheme of W. He. It consists of two parts. In the first part, we introduce the W. 
He digital signature scheme, whose security is claimed to be based on both the 
factoring and discrete logarithm problems, and which has a remarkable merit : 
not only does it permit users in the system to share a common modulus, but 
it also allows a user in the system to store only one number for her public key 
and only one number for her private key. In the second part, we present a 
cryptanalysis of the W. He digital signature scheme and prove that its security 
is not based on both the factoring and discrete logarithm problem. 




This chapter is a preliminary of the next chapters. In order to understand the 
cryptanalysis result presented in this thesis, a small amount of mathematical 
background and some notation are necessary, and they are presented in this 
chapter. 
In the following discussion, each section will introduce a concept in number 
theory or cryptology by giving definitions, theorems and important properties. 
Since sections are interdependent, readers should start from the beginning to the 
last subsection. However, experts may choose to skip this chapter and proceed 
directly to the next chapter. 
Proofs of theorems on number theory stated below can be found in [10 . 
2.1 Divisibility 
Definition Let a, b be integers. If there exists an integer m such that b = am, 
then a divides b, which is denoted by a\b. The integer a is called the divisor of 
6 
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b. 
2.2 Prime 
Definition Let p be an integer. If the only positive divisors of p are 1 and p, 
then p is a prime number (alternatively, p is prime). Otherwise, p is composite. 
2.3 Modular arithmetic 
Definition Let a, b be integers and b > 1. Then, there exists unique integers 
q, r such that a = qb + r and 0 < r < b. The remainder of the division of a by 
b, r, is denoted a mod b, 
2.4 Congruence 
Definition Let a, b, n be integers. If n|(a-6) , then a is congruent to b modulo 
n, denoted a 三 b (mod n). The integer n is called the modulus of the congru-
ence. 
2.5 Greatest Common Divisor 
Definition Let a, b be integers. Then, the greatest common divisor of a and b, 
gcd{a, b) is the largest positive integer that divides both a and b. 
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2.6 Integers modulo n 
Definition Z^ denotes the set of integers {0,1,2, ...，n 一 1}. Addition, subtrac-
tion and multiplication in Zn are done modulo n. 
Definition Z^ = {a e Zn\gcd{a,n) = 1} denotes the multiplicative group of 
2.7 Inverse 
Definition Let a G Zn- If there exists an integer x e Zn such that arc 三 1 
(mod n), then x is called the multiplicative inverse of a modulo n, denoted by 
a—i. Otherwise, a does not have a multiplicative inverse. 
Theorem 2.7.1 If gcd{a, n) = 1，then modulo n exists. 
2.8 Division in Zn 
Definition Let a,b G Zn- Then, division of a by 6 modulo n is defined iff 
exists. Moreover, the division of a by 6 is defined as the product of a and 
modulo n. 
2.9 Order of element 
Definition Let a G Z^. Then, the order of a is the smallest positive integer 
A; such that 三 1 (mod n). 
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2.10 Euclidean Algorithm 
Theorem 2.10.1 Let a, b be positive integers. Without loss of generality, as-
sume a>b. Then，gcd{a, b) = gcdifi, a mod b). 
Algorithm 2.10.1 (Euclidean Algorithm) 
INPUT: positive integers a, b with a > b. 
OUTPUT: gcd[a,b). 
1. Compute r = a mod b, 
2. Set a 二& and then b = r. 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until 6 = 0. 
4. Output the value of a. 
2.11 Extended Euclidean Algorithm 
The Euclidean Algorithm can be extended to find two integers {x, y) such that 
ax by = gcd{a, b), given integers a and b. 
If gcd{a, b) = 1，then in Zb, a—i exists. By using the extended Euclidean 
algorithm, one can find (x, y) such that ax + hy = 1. Thus, one can find x such 
that ax 三 1 (mod h). Note that x is equal to a—i in Z； by the definition 
of inverse. Therefore, given n，a G Z^, one can use the extended Euclidean 
algorithm to find the multiplicative inverse in Z*. 
Algorithm 2.11.1 (Extended Euclidean Algorithm) 
INPUT: positive integers a, b with a >b. 
OUTPUT: d = gcd{a, b) and integers x,y satisfying ax + by = d. 
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1. Set xi = 0,X2 = 1，yi = 1,^2 = 0. 
2. Compute q = |_fj, r = a mod h, x = X2 - qxi, y = y2 _ qyi, where 
denotes the largest integer that is smaller than or equal to x. 
3. Set a = 6,6 = r, X2 = xi.xi = x, y2 = yi,yi = y. 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until 6 二 0. 
5. Set d = a, X = X2, y 二 y2 and output (d, x, y). 
2.12 Chinese Remainder Theorem 
Theorem 2.12.1 Let a i , a 2 , a ^ be integers. Let ni, n?，r ik be integers such 
that gcd(jii, nj) = 1 for all i ^ j. Then, the system of simultaneous congruences: 
‘ 
X = ai (mod ni) 
三 a2 (mod n ) � 
< 
X = ak (mod Uk) 
\ 
has a unique solution x = E L i ckNiMi mod n in Zn where n 二 rhn<2“.nk，Ni = 
—and Mi = N广 mod rii. 
Tli 
2.13 Relatively Prime 
Definition Let a, b be integers. Then, a, b are relatively prime if gcd�a, b) = 1. 
2.14 Euler Totient Function 
Definition The Euler totient function, (/)(n), is defined as the number of integers 
in the interval [1, n) which are relatively prime to n, 
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Properties: 
1. If p is a prime number, then (j){p) = p — 1. 
2. If gcd{m, n) = 1, then (/)(mn) = 0(m)0(n). 
3. If n = where Pi，P2’.",Pa； are distinct prime numbers, then 
0(n) = n( l - 1 M ) ( 1 - 1/P2)...(1 - I M ) . 
2.15 Fermat's Little Theorem 
Theorem 2.15.1 (Fermat's little Theorem) Let a be an integer, p be a prime 
number. If gcd{a,p) = 1，then a”—丄三 1 (mod p). 
Remarks: 
1. Given an integer a and a prime number p, may not be congruent to 
1 modulo p. Nevertheless, a^ is congruent to a modulo p for all integers a. 
2. By Fermat's little theorem, if r 三 s (mod p - 1), then cf 三 a ' (mod p) 
for all integers a given that p is prime. Therefore, when working modulo 
a prime number p, exponents can be reduced modulo {p — 1). 
2.16 Euler's Theorem 
Theorem 2.16.1 (Euler's Theorem) Let n be an integer and n > 2. If a e 
then a於(…三 1 (mod n). 
Remarks: 
1. A special case of the Euler's theorem is the Fermat's little theorem. 
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2.17 Square root 
Definition Let b e Zn. If x G Z* satisfies a;?三 6 (mod n), then x is a square 
root of b modulo n. 
2.18 Quadratic residue 
Definition Let b e Z*. If there exists x e Z* such that 三& (mod n), then 
6 is a quadratic residue modulo n. If no such x exists, then 6 is a quadratic 
non-residue modulo n. 
Definition Qn denotes the set of all quadratic residues modulo n. Q^ denotes 
the set of all quadratic non-residues modulo n. 
Remarks: 
1. 0 is not a member of Qn nor Q几,since 0 ^ Z*. 
Properties: 
1. Let p be an odd prime. Then, there are exactly ( p - l ) / 2 quadratic residues 
modulo p and (p - l ) / 2 quadratic non-residues modulo p. In other words, 
IQpl = 早 and lOpI 二 宇 . 
2. Let n = pq where p, q are distinct odd primes. Then, there are exactly 
( p - l ) ( ^ - l ) / 4 quadratic residues modulop, and 3 ( p - l ) ( ^ - l ) / 4 quadratic 
non-residues modulo p. 
3. Let b e Qp where p is an odd prime. Then, b has exactly two square roots 
modulo p, one of which is also in Qp. 
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2.19 Legendre Symbol 
The Legendre symbol is a useful tool for testing quadratic residuosity. 
Definition Let p be an odd prime and a be an integer. The Legendre symbol, 
(^), is defined as: 
f 
0 if p\a 
( � = < 1 if a e Q p 
- 1 if a e Q p 
Properties: Let p be an odd prime and a, b be integers. Then,(尝）has the 
following properties: 
1. ( p = a(广i)/2 mod p. This formula is a useful tool for checking whether 
or not an integer a is a quadratic residue modulo a prime p. 
2 .(营）=( , ) (� ) .There fore , if a G Z；, then (f)=(含）since (*)=(芸）（芸）二 
(芸)2 = 1. 
3. If a 三 6 (mod p), then (^) = Q)-
4. 二 1 — 
5. (•) = (—i)(p2-i)/8 Thus, 2 G Qp if p 三 1 or 7 (mod 8), and 2 G if 
p 三 3 or 5 (mod 8) 
6. If q is an odd prime distinct from p, then ( ^ ) = ( 》 ） （ — T h i s 
is called the law of quadratic reciprocity. Hence, if p 三 3 (mod 4) and 
q 三 3 (mod 4)，then ( ^ ) = - � . O t h e r w i s e , ( f ) - ( � ) . 
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2.20 Jacobi Symbol 
Jacobi symbol is the generalization of Legendre symbol in that n is not neces-
sarily prime. 
Definition Let n > 1 be an odd integer. Suppose n = where 
Pi，P2,...,Pfc are distinct prime numbers and ei, 6 2 , e ^ are positive integers. 
Then, the Jacobi symbol,(尝)，is defined as: 
n/ >1 >2 Pk 
Properties: Let n > l , m > 1 be odd integers and a, b be integers. Then,(尝) 
has the following properties: 
1. Since a Jacobi symbol is a product of Legendre symbols,(尝）=0’ 1，or - 1 . 
Moreover,(尝）=0 iff gcd{a, n) + 1. 
2. Since ( 营 ） = ( 芸 ) ( 含 ） ( w h e r e p is prime) for Legendre symbols, we have a 
similar property for Jacobi symbol :(尝）二 ⑶ ( 告 ） 
3. 二（m)(n). 
4. Since for Legendre symbol (芸)二 (含)if a 三& (mod p) where p is an odd 
prime, we have a similar property for Jacobi symbol : if a 三& (mod n), 
then (尝)=(吾). 
5. Since ( - ) = 1, it is obvious that (^) = 1. 
6. ( ^ ) = (_1)(几-i)/2. Thus, if n 三 1 (mod 4), ( ^ ) 二 1. Otherwise, 
( ^ ) = - 1 
7. 二 (―1)(几2-i)/8 Thus, if n 三 1 or 7 (mod 8), ( f ) 二 1. Otherwise, 
m = —1 
14 
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8. (^)=(盒）（-i)(爪-i)(几-i)/4. Hence, if m 三 3 (mod 4) and n 三 3 (mod 4), 
then ( � = - ( 盒 ) . O t h e r w i s e , ( f ) = (^) . 
Remarks: 
1. It is easy to see that if the Jacobi symbol (^) = — 1, then a is a quadratic 
non-residue modulo n. The interesting case is (尝)=1，whence no con-
clusion can be drawn regarding whether or not a is a quadratic residue 
modulo n. Obviously, if a is a quadratic residue modulo n, then (^) = 1. 
However, if (^) = 1, it does not imply that a is a quadratic residue modulo 
n. For example, observe that = 1 but 7 0 Qus 
2.21 Blum Integer 
Definition Let n be an integer. U n = pq where p, q are distinct prime num-
bers, each of which is congruent to 3 modulo 4，then n is called a Blum integer. 
Properties: Let n = be a Blum integer. Let a be an integer. Then the 
following properties hold: 
1- = = 1 ) ( -1 ) = 1. 
2. Since ( f )=—(芸）and ( f ) = —(f), we have (〒）=(仏 
3. If x,y e Z* such that x^ 三 y] (mod n) and neither o ; 三 ( m o d n) nor 
工三一y (mod n), then (尝）二 - (尝) . 
4. If a G Qn, then a has four square roots modulo n, exactly one of which is 
also in Qn. 
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2.22 The Factoring Problem 
Definition Given a positive integer n, find its prime factorization; that is, find 
distinct prime numbers "',Pk and positive integers ei,e2, ...,ek such that 
The factoring problem is one of the oldest problems in number theory. If an 
integer n has less than 10 bits (i.e. n < 1024), then it is easy to solve the factor-
ing problem of n by simple trial division. However, if an integer n is large and has 
2048 bits, then the factoring problem of n is so computationally intractable that 
the trial division approach would take millions of years to complete. Of course, 
integer factorization has advanced significantly in the last decades, and there are 
advanced methods for solving the factoring problem much superior than the trial 
division approach. Well-known factoring algorithms include Pollard's rho algo-
rithm, Pollard's p - 1 algorithm, quadratic sieve, and number field sieve. Among 
these advanced factoring algorithm, number field sieve is the fastest and has a 
heuristic asymptotic time estimate of e(i-923+o(i))(inn)V3(ininn)V3 [叫 Neverthe-
less, the factoring problem of a 1024-bit-integer still remains a “hard，，problem 
today, and the security of many cryptographic techniques depends upon the in-
tractability of the factoring problem. In particular, the security of the RSA [2 
signature scheme is based on the factoring problem, and in practice, 1024-bit 
integers are commonly used. 
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2.23 The Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Definition Given a prime number p, integers a,/3 G Z*, find an integer x, 
1 < X < p - 1, such that 三卢 ( m o d p). 
Remarks: The discrete logarithm problem can be generalized to any finite 
cyclic group [10]. 
The discrete logarithm, like the factoring problem discussed in the last sub-
section, is a hard problem in number theory. So far, three remarkable algorithms 
for solving the discrete logarithm problem have been proposed: the linear sieve, 
the Guassian integer scheme, and the number field sieve. Despite that there 
have been significant advancement in algorithms for solving the discrete loga-
rithm problem, discrete logarithm in Zp where p is a large prime still remains a 
“hard” problem today. 
The security of many cryptographic techniques depends upon the intractabil-
ity of the discrete logarithm problem. The ElGamal signature scheme [6] is a 
well-known example, and in practice 1024-bit prime numbers are commonly 
used. 
2.24 One-way Hash Function 
Definition A one-way hash function h maps an input x of arbitrary finite 
length to an output h{x) of fixed bitlength n, with the following properties: 
1. For any given y, it is computationally infeasible to find x with h{x) 二 y. 
2. For any given x, it is computationally infeasible to find x x such that 
h{x) = h{x). 
17 
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In general, h{x) is much smaller than x\ for example, x might be one megabyte, 
whereas h{x) might be only 128 bits. Thus, in practice, hash functions are used 
in conjunction with digital signature schemes : a message m is hashed first, and 
then the hash value h{m) is signed in place of the original message. This use 
of hash functions will reduce both the computation time of signing process and 
the size of the signature. However, the use of hash function in digital signature 
creates a problem: on one hand, to avoid signature forgery, signatures for dif-
ferent messages should be distinct, but on the other hand, for all one-way hash 
functions there must exist at least two distinct messages that have the same 
hash value, since a one-way hash function is mapping a message of arbitrary 
length into a fixed bitlength output. Thus, collision cannot be avoided entirely, 
since in general the number of possible messages exceeds the number of possible 
outputs of the hash function. Therefore, in property 2 of the definition of a 
one-way hash function, "computationally infeasible" is the best that a one-way 
hash function can do to avoid collision of hash values. 
The design of a one-way function is by no means easy. Moreover, it turns 
out that many one-way hash functions are insecure and have been broken. For 
example, in [12]，Schnorr proposed a one-way hash function based on the discrete 
Fourier transform. However, it was broken by [13, 14]. After that, Schnorr 
proposed a revised version called FFT-Hashllin [15], which was then broken in 
16]. Tillich proposed another one-way hash function called SL2 in [17], however, 
it is insecure and broken by [18 . 
18 
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Survey of digital signature 
schemes 
Before presenting our cryptanalysis of the digital signature scheme in the next 
chapter, we in this chapter review some notable digital signature schemes related 
to our cryptanalysis result. This chapter gives a survey of some remarkable 
digital signature schemes, including the RSA signature scheme [2], ElGamal 
signature scheme [6], Schnorr signature scheme [7], Brickell-McCurley signature 
scheme [3], Okamoto signature scheme [4], Harn signature scheme [8]，Shao 
signature scheme [9]，and W. He signature scheme. The merits, demerits and 
security of these digital signature schemes are discussed. 
3.1 The RSA signature scheme 
Since the advent of public key cryptography by Diffie and Hellman [1], the first 
digital signature scheme invented was the RSA digital signature scheme [2]. This 
19 
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section introduces the RSA digital signature scheme and discusses the security 
of the RSA digital signature scheme. 
3.1.1 Key generation in the RSA signature scheme 
A user in the system generates her private key d and public key (e, N) as follows: 
1. Randomly choose two distinct prime numbers p and q. 
2. Compute N 二 pq and cj) = {p - l){q - 1). 
3. Randomly select an integer e such that 1 < e < 0 and gcd(e, (j)) = 1. 
4. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to find d such that 1 < d < • and 
ed=l (mod 0). 
5. Finally, the private key is d, and the public key is (e, N). 
Remark: In the RSA digital signature scheme, N is called the public modulus, 
and e is called the public exponent. 
3.1.2 Signature generation in the RSA signature scheme 
Using her private key d, a user (Alice) in the system can generate her signature 
on message m as follows: 
1. Compute s = m^ mod N. 
2. Finally, the signature of Alice for message m is s. 
3.1.3 Signature verification in the RSA signature scheme 
Given a user (Alice)'s signature s for message m, another user (Bob) can use 
Alice's public key (e，N) to verify Alice's signature s for message m as follows: 
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1. Compute m = s^ mod N. 
2. Accept the signature iff m = m (mod N). 
3.1.4 On the security of the RSA signature scheme 
This subsection considers several attacks on the RSA signature scheme, each of 
which has various requirements and effectiveness. 
A. Total break (Integer Factorization Attack) 
Suppose an adversary is able to factor the public modulus AT of a user (Alice), 
i.e. the adversary can find distinct prime numbers p,q such that N = pq, 
given N is the RSA public modulus of user Alice. Then, the adversary can 
compute 0 二（p — - 1)，and uses the extended Euclidean algorithm to 
determine the private key of user Alice by solving ed 三 1 (mod 0). Thus, 
Integer Factorization Attack leads to a total break of the system. 
Remark: As discussed in section 2.22, factoring a large composite number is a 
hard problem. Therefore, this attack can be prevented by using a large public 
modulus N. In practice, a 1024-bit public modulus is hard to factor. 
B. Existential Forgery 
The existential forgery proceeds as follows. First, an adversary chooses a value 
for s. Next, given the public key (e，N) of user Alice, the adversary compute 
m = s^ mod N. Then, s is Alice's signature for the message m. 
Remark: One way to counteract existential forgery in the RSA signature scheme 
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is to limit the set of messages that can be signed by the system users. For ex-
ample, all message which are allowed to be signed must have their last several 
bits conform to a specific pattern. 
C. Multiplicative Attack 
Suppose that Alice is a user in the system and an adversary possesses Alice's 
signatures Si for message rrii and S2 for message Then, the adversary can 
compute S3 = S1S2 mod N where N is the RSA public modulus of Alice. Note 
that S3 is a valid signature of Alice for the message ms = mim2 mod N, since 
S3 三 三 mfmg 三(mim2)e (mod N), where e is the RSA public exponent 
of Alice. 
Remark: The above attack can be prevented by applying a one-way hash func-
tion (say, h) to the message before signature generation. Then, even though an 
adversary can compute S3, he still has to invert the one-way hash function h in 
order to compute the new message ms 二 / i - i ( / i (mi)"(m2)). 
3.2 The ElGamal signature scheme 
In the previous section, we see that the security of the RSA signature scheme 
is based on the factoring problem. In this section, we introduce the ElGamal 
signature scheme [6], a classical digital signature scheme whose security is based 
on the discrete logarithm problem. 
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3.2.1 Key generation in the ElGamal signature scheme 
A user in the system proceeds as follows to generate her private key a and public 
key (j) ,a,y): 
1. Choose a random, large prime number p. 
2. Randomly choose a primitive element a in Z*, i.e. the order of a in the 
multiplicative group Z* is (p - 1). 
3. Select a random integer a, 1 < a < p - 2. 
4. Compute y = a�mod p. 
5. Finally, the private key is a, and the public key is (p, a, y). 
Remark: In the ElGamal digital signature scheme, p is called the modulus, and 
a is called the base. 
3.2.2 Signature generation in the ElGamal signature scheme 
To generate her signature on a message m, user Alice in the system can use her 
private key a to perform the following operations: 
1. Randomly choose an integer <k such that gcd{k,p- 1) = 1. 
2. Compute r = a^ mod p. 
3. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute k-1. 
4. Compute s = k_\m - ar) mod (p - 1). 
5. Finally, the signature of Alice for message m is (r, s). 
3.2.3 Signature verification in the ElGamal signature scheme 
Given a user (Alice)，s signature (r, s) for message m, another user (Bob) can 
use Alice's public key (p, a, y) to verify Alice's signature (r，s) for message m as 
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follows: 
1. Compute vi = y V mod p. 
2. Compute V2 — ol^ mod p. 
3. Accept the signature iff vi = V2, 
3.2.4 On the security of the ElGamal signature scheme 
Several attacks on the ElGamal signature scheme, each of which has various 
requirements and effectiveness, are discussed in this subsection. 
A. Total break (Discrete Logarithm Attack) 
Given user Alice's public key (p, a, y), if an adversary is able to compute discrete 
logarithm of the modulus y with respect to the base a in Zp, then the adversary 
can compute a such that y 三 a® (mod p). Since a is the private key of user 
Alice, the adversary can then forge signatures on behalf of Alice. Thus, the 
Discrete Logarithm Attack constitutes a total break of the system. 
Remark: As discussed in section 2.23, discrete logarithm is a hard problem. 
Therefore, this attack can be prevented by using a large modulus p. In practice, 
for a 1024-bit public modulus, it is hard to compute discrete logarithm. 
B. Existential Forgery 
An existential forgery attack proceeds as follows. Given the public key (p, a, y) of 
user Alice, an adversary randomly selects integers {u, v) such that gcd{v,'p-l) 二 
1. Next, the adversary computes r 二 modp and s 二 -rv-! mod (p 一 1). 
Then, (r, s) is Alice's signature for the message m = su mod (p — 1). 
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Remark: The above attack can be prevented by applying a one-way hash func-
tion (say, h) to the message before signature generation. Then, even though 
an adversary can compute (r, s) as mentioned above, he still has to invert the 
one-way hash function h in order to compute the new message m = h~^{su). 
C. Attack on signatures having the same k 
Suppose that an adversary possesses two signatures of a signer and the value of k 
of the two signatures are the same. Then, we have si = k~'^{mi-ar) mod ( p - 1 ) 
and S2 = /c-i(肌2 — ar) mod (p - 1), where r = a^ mod p, (p, a, y) is the public 
key of a user (say, Alice) and a is the private key of Alice. Therefore, the 
adversary can easily determine the private key of the signer by computing a = 
(m - 1 mod (p — 1). 
Remark: The use of a one-way hash function still cannot prevent this attack. 
Thus, it is important for the signer to use a different value of k for each signature 
generation. 
D. Acceptable range of r 
Consider the following attack: Suppose that an adversary has one valid signature 
s of a user (Alice) on a message m. Then, the adversary selects a new message 
m of its choices, computes u = mod ( p - 1 ) and s = su mod ( p - 1 ) . Next, 
by using Chinese Remainder Theorem discussed in section 2.12 , the adversary 
computes f such that f 三 ru (mod p - 1) and f 三 r (mod p). Thus, the 
adversary has computed a signature (f, s) for the desired message m. 
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Remark: The above attack cannot be prevented by using one-way hash func-
tions. To obviate the above attack, a constraint on r, 1 < r < p - 1, must be 
incorporated into the signature verification procedure. 
3.3 The Schnorr signature scheme 
This section introduces the Schnorr signature scheme [7], which is a well-known 
variant of the ElGamal signature scheme. 
3.3.1 Key generation in the Schnorr signature scheme 
A user in the system proceeds as follows to generate her private key a and public 
key {jp,q,v,a,h)\ 
1. Choose two random, large prime numbers p and q such that q\{p - 1). 
2. Randomly select an element a in Zp, with order q. 
3. Choose a one-way hash function h : Zq x Z ^ { 0 , - 1), where t is a 
security parameter. 
4. Randomly choose an integer a G {1, 2, q} and compute v = a—“ mod p. 
5. Finally, the private key is a, and the public key is (p, q, v, a, h). 
3.3.2 Signature generation in the Schnorr signature scheme 
Using her private key a, a user (Alice) in the system can generate her signature 
on message m as follows: 
1. Randomly select r G { 1 , . . . , ^ - 1}, and compute x = a'' mod p. 
2. Compute e = h{x, m) G {0,..., — 1}. 
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3. Compute y = r + ae (mod q). 
4. Finally, the signer's signature for message m is (e,y). 
3.3.3 Signature verification in the Schnorr signature scheme 
Given a user (Alice)，s signature {e,y) for message m, another user (Bob) can 
use Alice's public key {p,q,v,a,h) to verify Alice's signature {e,y) for message 
m as follows: 
1. Compute X 二 a V mod p. 
2. Compute e = h{x, m). 
3. Accept the signature iff e = e. 
3.3.4 Discussion 
In the Schnorr signature scheme [7], we see that the use of the subgroup of 
order q does not significantly improve computational efficiency over the ElGamal 
signature scheme. Nevertheless, the use of the subgroup of the order q does 
achieve smaller signatures than those of the ElGamal signature scheme. 
3.4 Digital signature schemes based on both 
the factoring and discrete logarithm prob-
lems 
While the security of handwritten signature lies in the difficulty of producing 
undetectable forged signatures, the security of digital signature depends on the 
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intractability of mathematical hard problems. In the previous sections, we see 
that the security of RSA is based on the factoring problem, in the sense that if 
an attacker can solve the factoring problem, then he can achieve a total break 
of the system. On the other hand, in the last section we see a different approach 
for the hard problem: the security of the ElGamal signature scheme is based on 
the discrete logarithm problem. 
In order to enhance security, several digital signature schemes based on both 
the factoring and discrete logarithm problems were proposed. In the following 
subsections, we gives a survey on these "hard" signature schemes and discuss 
their merits, demerits and security. 
3.4.1 The Brickell-McCurley signature scheme 
The Brickell-McCurley signature scheme [3] was the first digital signature scheme 
whose security is based on the difficulty of solving both the factoring and discrete 
logarithm problems. 
The Brickell-McCurley signature scheme is a modification of the Schnorr sig-
nature scheme discussed in the last section. The merit of the Brickell-McCurley 
signature scheme is that while it can enhance security by basing on both the 
factoring and discrete logarithm problems, at the same time it retains nearly 
the same high level of efficiency as that of the Schnorr signature scheme. 
Nevertheless, the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme is not exactly based 
on both the discrete logarithm and factoring problems. The reason is that in 
the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme, one of the hard problem, the factoring 
problem is to factor (p - 1), where p is a prime such that there exist integers 
q,w which are prime divisors of (p - 1). However, in the Brickell-McCurley 
28 
Chapter 3 Survey of digital signature schemes 
signature scheme, it is publicly known that the public key of a user contains 
an element a whose order is exactly equal to the unknown factor q of {p — 
1). In other words, in the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme, a,p are public, 
moreover, it is publicly known that a^ 三 I m o d p and q\p. Therefore, the 
Brickell-McCurley signature scheme is not exactly based on both the discrete 
logarithm and factoring problems. 
3.4.2 The Okamoto signature scheme 
Okamoto [4] proposed another digital signature scheme whose security is based 
on both the factoring and discrete logarithm problems. A remarkable merit of 
the Okamoto signature scheme is that it is provably secure. However, again, 
the security of the Okamoto signature scheme is not exactly based on both 
the discrete logarithm and factoring problems. Instead, the Okamoto signature 
scheme is proved to be based on both the discrete logarithm problem and the 
finding order problem only. 
In the Okamoto signature scheme, the finding order problem is defined as: 
Given a prime p and a base element g, compute the order of g in Z*. Thus, if 
one can solve the factoring problem, then he can solve the finding order problem, 
since the finding order problem can be solved by factoring {p - 1). However, 
on the other hand, if one can solve the finding order problem, then it does not 
mean that he can solve the factoring problem. Therefore, the security of the 
Okamoto signature scheme is not exactly based on both the discrete logarithm 
and factoring problems, since the Okamoto signature scheme is proved to be 
based on both the discrete logarithm problem and the finding order problem 
only. 
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Finally, concerning efficiency, the Okamoto signature scheme is less efficient 
than the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme in that it requires more compu-
tation and a larger signature size than does the Brickell-McCurley signature 
scheme. 
3.4.3 The Harn signature scheme 
In [8]，Harn proposed a digital signature scheme whose security is claimed to 
be based on both the factoring and discrete logarithm problems. The Harn 
signature scheme has a merit that the modulus p associated with discrete loga-
rithm and the modulus n associated with factoring are of nearly the same size, 
which allows the use of similar size moduli for same security level of the discrete 
logarithm and factoring problems. 
However, in [19], Lee and Hwang show that in the Harn signature scheme, 
even if an adversary can solve the discrete logarithm only but cannot solve the 
factoring problem, the adversary still can forge signature in the Harn signature 
scheme with high probability. Therefore, the security of the Harn signature 
scheme is not based on both the discrete logarithm and factoring problems. 
3.4.4 The Shao signature scheme 
In [9], Shao proposed two digital signature schemes, both of which are claimed 
to have their security based on both the discrete logarithm and the factoring 
problems. 
However, again, in [20], Li and Xiao show that the security of the Shao 
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signature schemes are not secure and are not based on any hard problem. With-
out the ability to solve both the discrete logarithm and factoring problems, an 
adversary still can forge signature in the Shao signature schemes. 
3.4.5 The W . He signature scheme 
Recently, W. He [5] proposed a new digital signature scheme, the security of 
which is claimed to be equivalent to computing both the discrete logarithm and 
the factoring problems. 
There are two remarkable merits in the W. He signature scheme: First, users 
in the system can share a common modulus. Second, a user in the system 
needs to store only one number for her public key and only one number for her 
private key. As a result, the W. He signature scheme has an improvement in 
storage efficiency over the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme and the Okamoto 
signature scheme. 
The W. He signature scheme is efficient in storage and computation, however, 
the security of the W. He signature scheme is not based on both the discrete 
logarithm and factoring problems, as proved in this thesis in the next chapter. 
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Cryptanalysis of the digital 
signature scheme of W. He 
To enhance security, W. He [5] recently proposed a new digital signature scheme, 
the security of which is claimed to be based on the difficulties of simultaneously 
solving the factoring and the discrete logarithm problems. 
The digital signature scheme of W. He has a remarkable merit : not only 
does it permit users in the system to share a common modulus, but it also 
allows a user in the system to store only one number for her public key and 
only one number for her private key. Thus, the W. He signature scheme has an 
improvement in storage efficiency over the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme 
and the Okamoto signature scheme discussed in the previous chapter. 
However, in contrast to He's claim, in this chapter we present a cryptanalysis 
of the digital signature scheme of W. He, and prove that the digital signature 
scheme of W. He is not based on the difficulties of simultaneously solving the 
factoring and the discrete logarithm problems. 
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For a self-contained and clear presentation of our cryptanalysis of the digital 
signature scheme of W. He, this chapter consists of two sections: i) In the 
first section, we introduce the digital signature scheme of W. He [5], ii) In the 
second section, we present a cryptanalysis of the digital signature scheme of W. 
He, and prove that the security of He's digital signature scheme is not based on 
the difficulties of simultaneously solving the factoring and the discrete logarithm 
problems. 
4.1 The Digital Signature Scheme of W . He 
Recently, in [5], W. He proposed a new digital signature scheme, the security 
of which is claimed to be based on the difficulties of simultaneously solving the 
factoring and the discrete logarithm problems in order to enhance security. This 
section, which introduces the digital signature scheme of W. He, serves as a 
preliminary for the cryptanalysis presented in the next section. 
4.1.1 System setup in the W . He Digital Signature Scheme 
In the system setup, a trusted centre selects a large prime P = + and an 
element g with order piqi in Zp, where pi = 2p2 + l , Qi = 2^ 2 + 1 and p i，仍，P2，仍 
are all distinct primes. A one-way hash function / ( . ) and the system parameters 
P, g are made public while pi, (h are all kept secret and discarded. 
Remark: Since P is public, piqi = {P - l ) / 4 is public. 
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4.1.2 Key generation in the W . He Digital Signature 
Scheme 
After the system setup, each user in the system randomly selects a private key 
X e Zp^q, such that gcd((a; + x-'^Y.piqi) = 1 and computes the corresponding 
public key y = g(工+厂〒 mod P. The public key y is published and the private 
key X is secretly stored. 
4.1.3 Signature generation in the W . He Digital Signa-
ture Scheme 
Having generated her private key x and public key y, a signer (Alice) can use 
her private key x to sign a message m. To generate a signature for message m, 
the signer performs the following steps: i) Randomly select an integer t G Zp^g^ 
such that gcd((t + r^ f^p iq i ) = 1，then compute ri = " ( 糾 — � mod P and 
厂2 = 乂 奸 广 m o d P. ii) Find s such that {x + x'^) = (t + r ^ ) + / ( r i , rs ,m)• 
{t + t—1)—1 (modpigi), where f is the published one-way hash function, iii) 
Send signature (ri,r2，s) to the verifier (Bob). 
4.1.4 Signature verification in the W . He Digital Signa-
ture Scheme 
Upon receiving the signature (ri,r2’s) for the message m with respect to the 
signer (Alice), using signer's public key y, the verifier (Bob) verifies the signature 
by checking the following congruent equality: 
？ /2(ri’r2’m) 2s./(ri’T"2’m) � „ {A -| \ 
y 三 7\�2 g mod F i^.ij 
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If the equality holds, then (ri，r2，s) is a valid signature of the signer Alice on 
the message m. 
4.2 Cryptanalysis of the digital signature scheme 
of W . He 
In [5], the security of the W. He signature scheme is claimed to be based on 
the difficulties of simultaneously solving the factoring and discrete logarithm 
problems. After reviewing the digital signature scheme of W. He in the previous 
section, in this section we present a cryptanalysis of the digital signature scheme 
of W. He, and prove that the security of digital signature scheme of He is not 
based on the difficulties of simultaneously solving the factoring and discrete 
logarithm problems. 
We present our cryptanalysis result in two subsections. In the first subsec-
tion, we derive two theorems on the security of the digital signature scheme 
of W. He. Then, in the second subsection, based on the two theorems in the 
first subsection, we design two algorithms for signature forgery in the digital 
signature scheme of W. He. 
4.2.1 Theorems on the security of the digital signature 
scheme of W . He 
In this subsection, we derive two theorems on the security of the digital signature 
scheme of W. He, which prove that the security of the W. He signature scheme 
is not based on both the factoring and discrete logarithm problems. 
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Theorem 4.2.1 Given a message m, system parameters (P,仏 f)，and user Al-
ice's public key y. Let (a) a, P be randomly chosen integers such that P is a 
power of g, 7 = 尸 一 ） m o d (c) X = mod P, (d) 
cr = 7—1 . y mod P, (e) : A^  三 a mod P, (f) n 二 1 + aP, r) = and 
s = S. Then, (ri,r2,s) is a valid signature of Alice for message m in He's 
digital signature scheme. 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that ( n = 1 + aP, r2 = = 5) satisfies 
the signature verification equation of the W. He signature scheme, i.e. y 三 
( 瓜 。 」 p ) ， i n Hc'S SCheHie ： 
s2 /2(ri,r2，m) 2s-/(ri ,7-2,m) 
Ti 厂2 g 
三（ 1 + aP) p g 
三 ( 1 + Q^P) .7.(9 ) 
三(1 + a P y ' • 7 . 
三 7 . 
三 7 . CT 
三 7 . (7-1") 
三 y (modP) • 
Theorem 4.2.2 Given a message m, system parameters (P, g, f ) , and user Al-
ice's public key y. Let (a) A be an integer randomly chosen in Zp^q^, (b) 
13 二 y入2 mod P, (c) a : f(a,久 m)三 A—i mod 触，(d) (J .. 三 a mod P, 
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(e) 7 = mod piQi, (f) n = a mod P,�2 = P, and s = j. Then, 
(ri,r2，s) is a valid signature of Alice for message m in He's digital signature 
scheme. 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that (ri = a , � 2 二 A s = 7) satisfies the signa-
• - , TTT tt 1 . �/2(7-i,r2,m) 2s-/(T-i,r2,m) 
ture verification equation of the W. He signature scheme, i.e. y 三 r\ r? 9 
(mod P) , in He's scheme: 
s2 /2(ri,r2’m) 2s./(ri ’7"2 ,m) 
Ti ”2 9 
三 a 13 g 
CT� A2/2(a’;8,m) 2/(a,/3,m)-7 
三 g y 9 
<7)2+2/(a’卢’ 入 …卢’爪） 
三 g . y 
” 2+2 入-1.7 A2.(A-1)2 
三 g y 
/ < 7 7 + 2 入 _ 1 、 7 
三（g ) y 
, < 7 ( _ 2 入— l a —1) + 2 入 - 1、7 
三、g ) y 
( _ 2 入 - 1 + 2 入 — 1 、 7 
三、g ) y 
= y (modP) 口 
4.2.2 Signature Forgery in the digital signature scheme 
of W . He 
In this subsection, based on the two theorems in the previous subsection, we 
design two algorithms for signature forgery in the digital signature scheme of 
W. He. 
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4.2.2.1 Signature Forgery Algorithm requiring discrete logarithm only 
By using Algorithm 4.2.1 stated below, without solving any factoring problem, 
in the W. He signature scheme [5] an adversary can impersonate any user and 
forge signature for any desired message, provided that he can solve the discrete 
logarithm problem. 
Given only the public key y of a signer. Without the knowledge of any valid 
signature and the private key of the signer, an adversary proceeds as stated in 
Algorithm 4.2.1 to forge a valid signature (n, r?，s ) for any desired message m: 
Algorithm 4.2.1 (Signature Forgery requiring discrete logarithm only) 
INPUT: m，P, 9, f，y. 
OUTPUT: n, r2, s. 
1. Arbitrarily choose two integers a, /3 such that 卢关 0 mod P, then set 
ri = 1 + aP and r] = P. 
2. Compute 7 = ^fHi+o.PAm) mod P,X = mod JP and 
a 二 7—1 . y mod P. 
3. Find 6 such that X^ = a mod P. 
4. Set s 
Remarks: 
i. The above steps do not require the adversary to solve any factoring prob-
lem. 
ii. In step 3, it is assumed that the adversary can solve the discrete loga-
rithm problem, i.e. given values A, a, P, the adversary can find S within 
polynomial time such that A*^  三 a mod P. 
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The correctness of Algorithm 4.2.1 is proved by Theorem 4.2.1. 
4.2.2.2 Signature Forgery Algorithm requiring only discrete logarithm 
and hash function inversion 
By using Algorithm 4.2.2 stated below, in the W. He signature scheme [5], 
without solving any factoring problem, an adversary can impersonate any user 
and forge signature for any desired message, provided that he can solve the 
discrete logarithm problem and invert a hash function. 
Given only the public key y of a signer. Without the knowledge of any valid 
signature and the private key of the signer, an adversary proceeds as stated in 
Algorithm 4.2.2 to forge a valid signature (n , 7*2, s) for any desired message m: 
Algorithm 4.2.2 (Signature Forgery requiring only discrete logarithm and hash 
function inversion) 
INPUT: m，P, g, f , y. 
OUTPUT: n, r2, s. 
1. Compute piqi = {P - l ) / 4 
2. Randomly choose an integer A in 他.Next, compute P = mod P. 
3. Find a such that f{a,/3,m)三 A—i mod piQi. 
4. Find a such that 三 a mod P. 
5. Compute 7 = - 2 • A"^ • c r ] mod piqi. 
6. Compute ri = a mod P, r2 = s = 7 . 
Remarks: 
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i. The above steps do not require the adversary to solve any factoring prob-
lem. 
ii. In step 3, it is assumed that the adversary is able to “ invert “ the hash 
function / ( . ) , i.e. given the adversary is able to find a 
within polynomial time such that f(a, m)三 A—i mod piQi. In addition, 
if the adversary feels that it is difficult to invert a particular value of 
A—i, then he can choose another value for A and repeats until a successful 
inversion is achieved. 
iii. In step 4，it is assumed that the adversary can solve the discrete loga-
rithm problem, i.e. given values a,g,P, the adversary can find a within 
polynomial time such that g"^ 三 a mod P. 
The correctness of Algorithm 4.2.2 is proved by Theorem 4.2.2. 
4.2.3 Remedy 
To counteract the signature forgery Algorithm 4.2.1, a remedy is to forbid the 
first entry of the signature from being equal to 1 (modulo P). However, there 




While handwritten signature plays an important role in traditional commerce, 
digital signature plays an important role in electronic commerce. Signature 
forgery is of great concern for all signature schemes, regardless of whether they 
are paper signature schemes or digital signature schemes. Therefore, it is de-
sirable to enhance the security of digital signature schemes, by using multiple 
(instead of a single) “hard” problems. 
After introducing the necessary definitions and theorems on number theory 
and cryptology in chapter 2, chapter 3 presents a survey on remarkable digital 
signature schemes based on a single hard problem as well as those based on 
multiple hard problems to enhance security. In chapter 3, we have discussed the 
merits, demerits and security of a variety of remarkable digital signature schemes 
related to our cryptanalysis result presented in this thesis, including the RSA 
signature scheme whose security is based on factoring, the ElGamal signature 
scheme and Schnorr signature scheme whose security is based on discrete loga-
rithm, the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme and Okamoto signature scheme 
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whose security is based on both the factoring and discrete logarithm problems, 
and the Harn signature scheme, Shao signature scheme, W. He signature scheme, 
each of which claims that its security is based on both the factoring and discrete 
logarithm problems. 
In chapter 4 we have presented our cryptanalysis of the digital signature 
scheme of W. He. The first section of chapter 4 introduces the W. He signature 
scheme whose security is claimed to be based on both factoring and discrete 
logarithm, and which has a remarkable merit that not only does it permit users 
in the system to share a common modulus, but it also allows a user in the system 
to store only one number for her public key and only one number for her private 
key. Thus, the W. He signature scheme has an improvement in storage efficiency 
over the Brickell-McCurley signature scheme and the Okamoto signature scheme. 
Then, in the second part of chapter 4, we have derived a cryptanalysis of the 
W. He digital signature scheme and proved that the security of the W. He 
digital signature scheme is not based on both the factoring and the discrete 
logarithm problems. Signature forgery algorithms that do not require solving 
the factoring problem are also derived in chapter 4. Finally, a remedy is proposed 
to counteract one of the proposed signature forgery algorithms. 
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